What makes these P2P file-sharing services different from Napster is that they “have no central servers that list what content is available. Every individual client acts as a server the publicly announces what is available...This makes defeating P2P systems almost impossible, since there are no critical components that can be struck down by law enforcement” (“Is Digitized Music becoming a Quasi-Public Good”). To reiterate, over 50 million people used Napster to pirate music. Imagine the same amount of people, each hosting an individual server; this is why most file-sharing is called “peer-to-peer.” Having millions of hosts to download from speeds up one's downloading and allows one a variety of downloads to choose from. The hosts are difficult to monitor because there are many of them.
One by one, authorities could shut down file-sharing websites. But, consider this: “Virtually all recorded music has already been converted into unencrypted MP3's and will still be available with or without Napster [or insert the next site here]” (“Journal of Public Policy Marketing”). As one site receives an injunction, the next site will achieve popularity; avid downloader's will be drawn to it. The music industry was aware of Websites similar to Napster. The music industry was losing both money and customers: “23 percent of those music consumers surveyed said that they did not buy more music in 2001 because they downloaded or copied most of their music for free” (RIAA). The RIAA said that the domestic shipment of music products fell 10.3 percent in 2001, and that the value of all their products decreased by over half a billion.
Many paradigms were modeled to solve the recording industry's problem. For example, the music industry developed Internet music services. These services allow one who has a subscription to it to download songs. Most of them appear to have been ineffective. The only service that appears to rival Apple is Rhapsody. “RealNetworks says that Rhapsody subscribers streamed more than 16.4 million songs in August [2003]-an average of more than 500,000 songs per day” (VNU 2003). But Apple nearly solved the RIAA's piracy problems.
Apple brought the world the iPod and iTunes in 2001. “The 6.5-ounce iPod, a stainless steel device about the size of a deck of cards, can carry 1,000 digital recordings on a five-gigabyte hard drive. It is designed to work with Apple's iTunes music-jukebox software” (Daw Jones 2001). The iPod is a small, portable device similar to an mp3 player. With the iPod, one isn't be troubled with maintaining their CD collection; they carry virtually every song in one device. In 2003, the profundity of the iPod advanced: “Apple CEO Steve Jobs is expected to introduce the company's first Internet music service, which will allow customers to download songs from a broad catalog of music for about 99 cents each or $10 per album,”(“Taking it Online after Years of Digital Piracy”). This meant that users could buy songs cheaply and easily; they would load directly to Itunes where the customer could transfer them to their Ipod.
However, certain motions have made the process of hearing the music difficult for consumers. Different digital retailers provide their music in different formats that are incompatible with the next seller. This is Digital Rights Management (DRM): “Apple, Real, Microsoft and Sony all have competing DRM systems. That's why a song purchased on Sony's Connect service won't transfer to an iPod…a proposed solution to making sure songs wouldn't be traded illegally” (“Closed Systems Leave Song Buyers Out in the Cold”). As a result, certain CD's cannot be loaded into iTunes. How one might access their music is limited to its supported devices/software. Conversion of the digital music is possible, but it is a tedious process. Conversely, the MP3 song is available among all P2P file-sharing networks. It is easily accessed and easily ripped to MP3 players amongst various brands.
One might wonder why digital retailers don't' use uniform audio formats. The answer is simply, money. Sony BMG and Time Warner wanted to sell popular songs for a dollar and forty-nine cents, but Apple refused to change from their uniform 99 cent per song price. As a result, Sony made their CDs incompatible with iTunes. “The divide among the four record companies reflects …whether the fast-expanding digital market is stable enough to bear a mix of prices…while millions of consumers still trade music free on unauthorized file-swapping networks” (“Apple, Digital Music's Angel, Earns Record Industry's Scorn”). In an unstable realm of business, the internet, it is ludicrous to argue over song prices. The major labels should have been satisfied that some people were willing to pay. Arguing over how to price songs, essentially business, will only interfere with effective music sales. And unpopular songs shouldn't be more valuable than popular songs. Consider that Rhapsody makes a considerable profit from selling unpopular music: “Fully 40 percent of Rhapsody's sales come from tracks that are not available in offline retail stores, suggesting their's gold in aggregating those relatively unpopular songs” (Gillespie 62). This means unpopular songs are valuable despite ephemeral, popular niche markets. The price per song was and is the least of the industry's worries.
